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University Press, New York, 1986) 
Since its start, bioethics played an important role in 
bringing about change. This happened at two levels: 
at the level of theory, through the challenge that many 
of the most respected scholars in the field made to the 
conventional doctrine of the sanctity of human life; 
and at Ule level of practice, through the opportunity it 
offers to confront problems in a rational, pluralistic 
way, comparing different arguments and different 
substantive positions. 
At the first level, the discussions about abortion and 
euthanasia, leading to the distinction between being 
human in a descriptive, biological sense and being 
human in an evaluative, philosophical sense (that is, 
being rational, autonomous etc.), launched an attack 
on the view that has been termed a<; "humanism." As it 
has been emphasized, humanism has, so to speak, two 
sides: an inclusive one which holds that all humans have 
equal moral status, and an exclusive one which holds 
that only humans have equal moral status. l The critique 
which has been put forward as to the inclusive side led 
to a critique of the exclusive side, thus furthering the 
revision of the traditional notion of moral community 
which animal liberation ethics pursues. While the 
evidence of iliis overlapping is wide, it could be enough 
here to mention the challenge to the moral relevance of 
species Michael Tooley presents in his seminal essay 
on abortion and infanticide and James Rachels' 
acknowledgment of the role played by the abandonment 
of speciesist prejudice in the development of his views 
about euthanasia2 A serious rethinking of the moral 
status of nonhumans seems thus to be a major element 
in bioethical reflection. 
The second, practical kind of impact bioethics can 
have has been the object of some reflection in the 
relevant literature. It was eveu said that medicine saved 
the life of ethics as a social practice, after the long period 
ofmainly theoretical inquiries covering at least the first 
sixty years of the twentieUl century.3 Wi thout going to 
such extremes, however, some interesting explorations 
of the possible role of bioethical discussions have been 
offered. In a recent article, for example, Peter Singer, 
starting from the real case of an infant with Down's 
syndrome, sketches a sort of ideal bioeUlical debate 
which shows how, even if we grant that the basis of 
ethical judgments is immune from rational criticism, 
ample scope is left for the application of reason and 
argument, and accordingly for bioethics to play an 
important role in the application of ethics in a largely 
secular society.4 
Doth these radical features of bioethics-the cri tique 
of humanism and the innovative social function---<:an 
be found in The Foundations ofBioethics by Tristram 
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EngelhardtJr. They have, however, undergone a curious 
process. While the latter has swollen out of proportion, 
to the extent that it has become the core of tbe volume, 
tbe fonner has notably shrunk, due to the disappearance 
of one of its horns, the critique of the exclusive side of 
humanism. It is this particular aspect of Engelhardt's 
argument, which enables him to lightheartedly license 
not only the employment of millions of nonhumans in 
medical practices, but also their use for food and even 
sport, the one I want to focus on. To do this, however, I 
shall have to deal with the other. Not only, in fact, are 
they inextricably interwoven, but it is precisely starting 
from his conception of the bioethical arena that 
Engelhardt develops his view of the moral status of 
nonpersons, both human and nonhuman. One notion is 
central to this context, as well as to the whole book: tlle 
notion of peaceable community. 
The peaceable community I: historical 
Before starting, it will be useful to give an idea, however 
approximate, of the structure of The Foundations of 
Bioethics. After putting bioethics in its historical 
context and discussing at some length the nature of 
ethics, the author gets on to his specific subject with 
the enunciation and justification of the two principles 
he sees as the basis of bioethics: the principle of 
autonomy and the principle of beneficence. Such a 
basis is further explained and illustrated in the section 
on persons, possessions and state authority and-after 
an illuminating digression on the different possible 
approaches to disease (evaluative, descriptive, 
explanatory etc.)-its implications are explored with 
regard to problems like abortion, infanticide, free and 
infonned consent, suicide and euthanasia. Finally, the 
issue of the "rights to health care" leads the author to 
make a rapid incursion into the field of political 
philosophy, tackling problems such as justice and 
inequality. Where does the peaceable community fits into 
this picture? The notion appears at every crucial step in 
the argument: but, I shall argue, with different meanings. 
"In this volume I will talk of peaceable secular 
pluralistic societies so as to indicate societies including 
a diversity of moral viewpoints, and enjoying in 
addition a freedom of moral opinion without the fear 
of repression."(4) This can be considered the first 
appearance of the peaceahle community. Both its 
fonnulation and its context characterize it in a precise 
way: the idea of the peaceable community is concrete 
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and historical. It has to be realized here: in a Western 
society which embraces "not only America and 
Europe, but societies such as Japan and Taiwan as 
well,"(6) and one can imagine that the author, if writing 
now, would include the ex-Soviet Union too. And it 
has to be pursued now: in a moment when historical 
forces "have led to the major institutions of most 
democracies no longer being associated in a significant 
fashion with an established church."(4) Having 
included among the religions of the world also overall 
worldviews like Marxism, Engelhardt goes on to say 
that a peaceable secular society is characterized by 
the absence of any particular religious or moral 
orthodoxy imposed by force. 
If taken as an actual description of the specific 
society he refers to, I do not think this statement matches 
reality. It is true that in Western society many areas of 
moral life which were once dominated by dogmatic 
views are now open to different approaches; but it seems 
equally true that the countries in which we live accept 
some basic principles in whose defence the resort to 
force is accepted---e.g. that taking the life and infringing 
the liberty of (at least) adult humans is pril1U1 facie 
wrong, while nonhuman lives are expendable. And it 
won't do to say that, as the author will argue later, these 
are (some) of the few principles a peaceable community 
can, indeed should, accept: in this context, this would 
simply beg the question. The historical version of the 
peaceable community can make sense only in the 
restricted meaning of a sub-community, whose 
peaceable debates should confine themselves to the 
particular spheres of social life that are not covered by 
the forced imposition of the society's (basic) moral 
orthodoxy. This is not, however, the author's own 
interpretation, since his goal is more ambitious. 
The peaceable community II: ethical 
I shall now try to follow the line of reasoning that 
attempts to achieve such a greater goal. This is no easy 
task, as the argument is dispersed and seems to appear 
and vanish, as a subterranean stream, in different 
moments and contexts. The starting point is the alleged 
impossibility of justifying a particular moral viewpoint. 
In the author's opinion, after the historical failure of 
the religious attempt to impose a unitary morality and 
the collapse of the Humanistic hope to provide a secular, 
general justification of a specific moral viewpoint, we 
are forced to accept what he metaphorically calls the 
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"polytheistic presumption"-that is, the idea that there 
are a number of equally defensible, but quite different, 
moral perspectives. Engelhardt supports his point 
through a rapid survey of the major secular aUempts to 
reach objectivity in ethics, attempts that he rejects in 
turn, mainly on the charge of being question begging. 
One could quibble with the details of his account, such 
as the overlooking of the fact that preference 
utilitarianism is a fonn ofconsequentialism which does 
not "need already to know which consequences are 
better or worse than others,"(31) or the partially 
misleading reference to Henry Sidgwick on the subject 
of intuitionism.(33) One could also question the way 
he gathers in a single list of allegedly inadequate 
"standards in ethics" such different items as charac-
terizations of the etllical such as the reference to the 
idea of impartiality, questions in etllics such as the 
appeal to the consequences of actions or to natural law, 
and theories about ethics such as the claim that moral 
principles can be grasped by intuition. Engelhardt's 
conclusion is, at any rate, that all concrete moral choices 
fail as they already presuppose a particular moral sense, 
and iliat such a result could bring us to nihilism, but for 
a saving factor: the possibility of creating commonly 
accepted procedures. For this to succeed generally, 
however, an inescapable procedural basis is needed: 
"This basis, if it is to be found at all, will need to be 
disclosable in the very nature of ethics itself. Such a 
basis appears to be available in ilie minimum notion of 
ethics as an alternative to force in resolving moral 
controvcrsies."(4l) From the alleged individuation of 
a transcendental condition-in the sense of existence 
condition-for ilie moral world stems a central role for 
consent: the conclusions to the process of ethical 
reasoning are iliose that peaceable negotiators have all 
agreed to accept. To be a negotiator, one should be self-
conscious, rational and in possession of a sense ofmoral 
concern, Le. one should be a moral agent, or a person; 
and the community of negotiators is the moral 
community,5 or the "inner sanctum of morality" where 
ilie transcendental condition for ethics finds expression 
in the principle of autonomy, or mutual respect.6 
The picture is starting to take shape. Engelhardt's 
claim is twofold: he argues that his conclusion is 
inescapable and purely formal. I shall object to both 
contentions in turn. While the criticism of the latter 
requires that we pursue ilie argument a little further, 
the fonner can already be dealt with. Though the author 
himself wouldn't agree with this descriptilon~and in 
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fact he carefully avoids using the term-what the 
attempt to avoid nihilism has produced is something 
akin to a version of contractarianism, i.e. of the view 
that the demands of morality are fixed by agreement. 
Does the argument's premise actually entail this 
conclusion? And, in the first place, what exactly is the 
premise? Engelhardt's starting point is the alleged 
impossibility ofjustifying a particular moral viewpoint. 
Such "polytheistic presumption" seems to imply 
relativism-Leo the doctrine according to which no 
single moral code has universal validity. If it actually 
does is, however, difficult to detect. The auilior's 
account of the failure of the attempts to assert a 
particular moral viewpoint is both theoretical and 
factual. It is theoretical when the various methods and 
theories in ethics are considered and criticised; and it is 
factual when tile "crumbling of the presumed possibility 
of a uniformity of moral viewpoint" is linked up with 
Lutller's ninety-five thesis,(3) or when we are told that, 
whenever we consider a society of fair scope, we will 
have a pluralism of moral beliefs. The latter approach 
does not entail meta-ethical relativism, as is proved, to 
make just one example, by the position of Alasdair 
MacIntyre, whose historical account Engelhardt 
mentions in support of his own analysis.(9)7lf relativism 
is not entailed, it remains possible to hold a universalist 
position, that is, to conceive of a particular normative 
theory having objective validity; accordingly, not only 
the discovery ofa specific procedural basis for ethics, 
but also tile general search for it is not "inescapable." 
If, on the other hand, the statement of the impossibility 
of asserting a universally valid moral viewpoint is 
theoretical, what we face is meta-eiliical relativism; 
but then, "inescapability" is precluded by ilie very same 
doctrine. It is precluded, at least, unless one makes some 
assumptions, which transform the pure version of 
relativism into a more qualified one. And this is exactly 
what Engelhardt does-and admits of doing. In the same 
passage in which he acknowledges his debt towards 
MacIntyre, he comments: "I, unlike Maclntyre, hold 
that there is a vindication for a shred of the 
Enlightemnent dream: the rationality of resolving moral 
controversies through agreement."(63, n. 48) To assume 
the value of agreement (and peace) is to make a choice: 
and it is from this choice, and not from relativism, that 
the necessity of a procedural basis stems. Engelhardt 
himself seems aware of this problem. A few pages after 
charging Rawls with circularity, on the grounds that 
each specific description of the original position-that 
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is, of the hypothetical contracting situation-already 
presupposes a theory ofjustice, and thus cannot produce 
one, he tries to facc the same difficulty with regard to 
his own theory. He writes: "As such, this analysis has 
the character of unpacking a tautology. Such circular 
reasoning (i.e., reasoning from the notion of ethics as 
the enterprise ofresolving moral controversies without 
a fundamental recourse to force, to the principle of 
respecting the freedom of participants in a controversy 
as the basis of ethics) is tolerable if it discloses the 
characterofa major elementof the lives ofpersons."(46) 
I don't think the attempted defence can work. The notion 
of person is in this context an extraneous, unwarranted 
element Which, far from providing justification, is in 
need of justification. Without it, Engelhardt's self-
critical remark on circularity stands, clearly 
undermining any claim to inescapability. 
If the argument is not inescapable, is it at least 
purely formal? The adjective Engelhardt uses to 
qualify it, "transcendental," is overtly borrowed from 
Kant; and other features of the theory, in the first place 
the role ascribed to respect for persons and the 
attribution of a particular moral status to moral agents, 
are remindful of Kantian ethics. Engelhardt is, 
however, critical of his great model; and a discussion 
of his claims will cast light on the problems with his 
theory. The criticism is rather original, given the 
frequency of the opposite accusation of formalism: 
Kant is charged with "smuggling concreteness" into 
what should he a purely procedural framework. 
Though Engelhardt focuses on two elements, the 
condemnation of suicide and the obligation of 
beneficence, I shall not consider his objections to the 
former, which has not been taken too seriously 
beginning at least from Schopenhauer;8 the critique 
of the latter is, on the contrary, of great importance, 
as it leads to a detaching from Kant's account of the 
moral domain. In brief, Engelhardt claims that Kant's 
reliance on a contradiction of the will rather than on a 
conceptual contradiction in order to ground a principle 
of beneficence shows how beneficence cannot be 
generated by a purely formal thesis. Feeling thus 
confirmed in his view that, while the principle of 
autonomy is connected with procedure, the principle 
of beneficence is linked with content, he contrasts the 
equation form/universality to the equation content/ 
particularity, and confines to the realm of subjectivity 
a beneficent commitment which is perceived as a 
collection of "concrete accounts of virtues and vices" 
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and of "different understandings of the good life." 
Given its non-procedural character, the principle of 
beneficence is weaker than, and subordinate to, the 
principle of autonomy; but for tllis very reason it is 
not confined to the realm of moral agents. With a 
further variation on his dichotomic structure, which 
matches the deontological character of respect for 
autonomy with the teleological-"and most likely 
utilitarian"-character of the obligation of beneficence, 
Engelhardt grounds the attempt to secure the maximal 
balance of benefits over harms not only for persons, 
but also for the entities that inhabit the no-man's-land 
outside the moral community. 
This marks the collapse of what has been called the 
agent/patient parity principle9-the principle that moral 
patients must be moral agents-and creates a category 
of second-class moral patients. Generically labeled as 
animal life, those beings include nonhuman animals and 
various human nonpersons, such as zygotes, embryos, 
fetuses, infants, the senile and the severely disabled. 
The sort and intensity of the duties towards those 
beings will vary in relation to a hierarchy based on 
their level of consciousness, but not only. In fact, the 
principle of beneficence is doubly constrained: first, it 
works within the bounds of respecting autonomy; 
second, it changes according to the different under-
standings of different moral agents. Furthermore, given 
that persons have a right of preemption on welfare 
which discounts the claims of nonpersons, it can 
happen that beings at the bottom of the hierarchy are 
thrown to its top, and even granted the staws ofpersons 
"in the social sense," only on the grounds of the utility 
this yields for actual persons. 
Such a changing account of the moral domain at 
first sight lays itself open to an internal criticism. The 
binary, hierarchical-and somewhat mechanical-
view of the moral life Engelhardt embraces collides 
Witll the main tenet of his theory, Le. the principle of 
respecting the freedom of participants in a moral 
controversy. Engelhardt seems to forget that there are 
ethical views in which the duty of beneficence, far 
from grounding only a secondary committnent, lies at 
the core of the moral life. Utilitarianism is an example; 
and one of the features of utilitarian theory is that its 
constituency includes all sentient beings. Engelhardt's 
view would require that utilitarians, faced with a 
situation in which they could maximize positive 
consequences by relieving the suffering inflicted by a 
person to nonpersons-say, animals-refrain from 
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doing this in the name of the principle of autonomy. 
This would simply llillount to asking them to give up 
what they see as their overriding duty, and accordingly 
to be immoral on their own view. How can this fit 
with respecting the freedom of the participants in 
moral controversies? 
But the real problem, the one that invalidates the 
claim to formalism and discloses the substantive nature 
of the theory, is elsewhere. It lies in the subdivision of 
the moral domain into two levels. In Kant's theory, 
thanks to the agent/patient parity principle, the 
principle of autonomy covers the whole constituency. 
Kant's argument can be purely formal because the 
version of the categorical imperative that is known as 
the "formula of the end in itself," which demands that 
we treat "humanity, both in [our] own person and in 
the person of every other, al ways as an end, never as a 
means merely,"IO acts as a side constraint with 
reference to all the parties in the moral domain. One 
can object to Kant's withholding of any moral 
considerability from nonrational beings, or to the 
equation he establishes between rational beings and 
humans;U but, once such an account is accepted, 
respect for persons is really a purely formal 
requirement. If, on the other hand, we break the unity 
of the moral domain, as it is the case with the doctrine 
of the two levels, every formal principle which is 
confined to one of them, and does not involve just a 
distinctive sort of moral constraint, but a special 
weighty one,12 becomes substantive with respect to 
the other. This is exactly what happens with 
Engelhardt's stratified moral domain. Since the 
principle of autonomy and the principle of beneficence 
are arranged in lexical order-that is, the first one has 
to be fully satisfied before it becomes possible to move 
on to the second-and since the parties in the lower 
level are not covered by the principle of autonomy, 
the claims of the second-class moral patients will 
always be overridden by the claims of the members 
of the moral community. To put it in other terms, being-
owed-respect will directly result in cashing out special 
moral status. 
Thus, to say that only persons are owed respect is 
not simply to provide existence conditions for the 
ethical: it is also to advance asubstantive interpretation 
of ethics. The charge of "smuggling concreteness" into 
what should have been a merely procedural argument 
that was directed against Kant seems more suited to 
the one who made it. 
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The peaceable community III: political 
Contract theories are most often social contract theories, 
and the present one constitutes no exception. Engelhardt 
clearly states that secular ethics is an enterprise in public 
policy making, and behind the question "how can we 
establish the moral world?" always lurks the question 
"how can we establish a peaceable secular pluralist 
society?" Though the book devotes much room to the 
discussion of the social and economic features of such 
a society, what is relevant here is the underlying 
structure, which closely follows the structure of the 
moral domain. TIle basic dichotomy is once again easily 
detectable: on the universal, objective side, there is the 
state, a political association whose members do not 
necessarily share a cornmon, concrete view of the good;-
on the particular, subjective side, there are the different 
communities which live on shared, specific moral 
perspectives. The procedural focus of the state expresses 
itself in securing the mutual respect of persons, Le. 
offering the impartial protection of citizens from 
murder, robbery, and other unauthorized touchings of 
themselves or their property-a property which, on 
Engelhardt's view, includes many second-class moral 
patients, i.e. nonhuman animals, young children and 
"mere human biological organisms."(134) While moral 
authority comes from the consent of peaceable moral 
agents, basic political authority comes from the implicit 
consent of peaceable citizens, interested in being 
safeguarded from unconsented-to force. 13 On the other 
hand, the lives of those same citizens will take on full 
significllilCe only in particular moral worlds-say, the 
communities of Orthodox Jews, Texian deists or Black 
Moslems-which give instruction regarding peculiar 
moral values to pursue. 
Being a sort ofprojection of the ethical construction, 
Engelhardt's political theory shares most of its 
difficulties. The different character of the political 
context, however, alters their impact. In particular, since 
in social and political life, as contrasted to the ethical 
sphere, we are prepared to give up some ofour demands 
in favour of the results of "a decision procedure which 
represent[s] a fair compromise between competing 
claims to power,"14 the idea of the priority of generally 
agreed-on rules over more local claims becomes-
although with some important provisos-plausible. The 
political framework can also cast some light on the 
peculiar fact that, though no clear differentiation 
between "ethical" and "moral" is proposed, Engelhardt 
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defines ethics as the enterprise of resolving moral 
controversies: if correlated with the existence of the 
particularmoral worlds described above, such definition 
acquires a precise meaning. 
This very meaning, however, points out further 
problems. The focus on moral controversies is made 
possible by the fact that fundamental nonmoral problems 
are tackled by the state through basic protection from 
murder, robbery, and other unauthorized touchings. But 
which beings are so protected? Only persons-the 
second-class moral patients being debaned from the side 
constraints which apply in the moral community, and 
accordingly from the protective scope of the law. As the 
role of warrantor of respect for persons played by political 
authority is expressed in protecting innocent persons15 
from assault as well as from interference, not only 
nonhuman animals, but also human nonpersons are left 
at the mercy of the particular moral worlds-though 
Engelhardt manages to avoid the most unpopular 
outcomes of his theory through the notion of social 
person. The application of this doctrine, usually confined 
to nonhuman animals, to members ofour species has the 
effect of emphasizing a fundamental problem, which 
occurs both in the political domain and in the moral one. 
In neither sphere are persons-even supposing that they 
are the only f1wral orpolitical agents-the only agents, 16 
and itis difficult to see why (qualitied) nonmoral freedom 
from interference should be a priori accorded only 
contingently on (qualified) moral freedom from 
interference. Engelhardt's explanation seems to be that 
persons being the source of moral values, they are the 
existence condition for the peaceable community. 
However, this does not mean that they are the only 
members of such community, or the only beings which 
have ultimate value (and which should accordingly be 
unconditionally protected). To say this would amount to 
confusing how the values of an ethic are to be achieved 
with what is to be achieved by such an ethic.17 Engelhardt 
appears to mingle, once again, formal and substantive. 
Though the moral capacity, and accordingly the entities 
which possess it, play an essential role in a purely formal 
thesis about values, the thesis that only moral agents have 
ultimate moral standing is not a purely fonnal thesis about 
values. Rather than supplying existence conditions for 
all claims about values, it advances one such claim. It is 
therefore a substantive thesis about the beings that have 
ultimate value or moral standing. ls If, consequently, 
selective protection for persons is not warranted by tlle 
argument from moral agency, different reasons must be 
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offered for Engelhardt's radically dichotomic political 
doctrine to stand. 
Conclusion 
I have argued that the structure of the peaceable 
community, be it historical, ethical or political, is deeply 
flawed. If my arguments are sound, Engelhardt's 
foundations cannot sustain the overgrown framework 
into which the social context of bioethical debate has 
developed. Accordingly, his particular appeal to the 
notion of person-coupled with some subtle 
escamotages about human nonpersons-{:annot justify 
a view which entails in the concrete the forsaking of 
any critique of the exclusive side of humanism. It seems 
that a discussion of the moral status of the countless 
nonhumans which are employed in biomedical practice, 
as well as in any other practice socially sanctioned by 
discrimination based on species, deserves from a book 
of ethics something more than a few dismissing lines 
out of nearly four hundred pages. 
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